THE CLINICAL EXPERIENCE:
A CASE ANALYSIS
Robert A. Solomon*
In trying to combine the best possible educational experience for the student with the highest quality legal services to the
client, the clinician has one foot in each of two very different
worlds. At one extreme, practitioners view academics as ivory
tower thinkers with no sense of the real world. At the other extreme, academics view practitioners as trades-people, moving
cases to conclusion without any examination of either the public
policy behind the law or its theoretical underpinning. The chasm
can be large.
This is the story of how Yale Law School's Homelessness
Clinic dealt with that problem and the educational theory behind
the clinic's legal work.
BACKGROUND

In 1980, Stephen Wizner and Dennis Curtis described the
clinical program they developed at Yale Law School.' Wizner
and Curtis began by noting that academic colleagues, practicing
lawyers and non-lawyers were unfamiliar with the workings of the
clinical program. 2 This article attempts to build on Wizner and
Curtis, not by revisiting their article, but by describing a portion
of Yale's clinical program through case narrative, literally examining what we did in a single case and why we made particular
decisions.
During 1986 and 1987, the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services
Organization, Yale's clinical program, instituted three separate
housing clinics: (1) Landlord-Tenant; (2) Workshop on Shelter
for the Homeless; and (3) Homelessness. Each clinic is co-taught
by two clinical faculty members who serve as supervising attorneys, has a separate classroom component and is modeled after a
law firm with its own caseload.
* Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School. My thanks to Robert Ellickson,

Chris Gillkerson, Catherine Iino, Jean Koh Peters, Jay Pottenger and Steve Wizner
for their helpful comments. My gratitude and admiration for the many students
who worked on Savage v. Aronson-you made it worth writing about.
I See Stephen Wizner & Dennis Curtis, Here's What We Do: Some Notes About
Clinical Legal Education, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 673 (1980).
'2 Id. at 673.
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In the Landlord-Tenant Clinic, students represent tenants
being evicted pursuant to Connecticut's summary process statute. Nearly all the cases are referrals from New Haven Legal
Assistance Association, the local legal services provider. Therefore, by the time the clinic receives the case, the eviction process
has commenced and the client has been screened for financial
eligibility in accordance with Legal Services Corporation guidelines (125% of the federal poverty level).5 The clinic focuses on
litigation with an emphasis on oral and written advocacy and
classes structured as litigation conferences. Because of the structure of New Haven's Housing Court and the nature of eviction
cases, however, the students may also engage in supervised mediation and negotiation in many cases.
The Workshop on Shelter for the Homeless, which emerged
from the Homelessness Clinic, attempts to broaden clinical legal
education to include transaction-oriented lawyering skills. The
clinic includes students from the business school and school of
architecture, along with law students, and provides legal and consulting services to managers and developers of low-income housing. The origins and work of the Shelter Project are described
more fully in various works written by students participating in
the clinic, including a "how-to" handbook.4
The Homelessness Clinic was the second law practice in the
country to offer its services to homeless people by providing outreach at homeless shelters.5 Within a year of its founding, we
extended our outreach program to soup kitchens and welfare
motels. While we expected a large number of benefits problems
and housing issues, we were surprised by the diversity of
problems, which included questions of family, criminal and
mental health law, workers' compensation, personal injury and
veterans' rights. Each semester, in addition to regular weekly
outreach, students participate in a major project, such as a class
action challenging the City of New Haven's housing payments for
3 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996(a) to 2996(1) (1988).
4 See YALE SHELTER PROJECT, HOMES FOR THE

HOMELESS:

A

HANDBOOK FOR

Ac-

TION (1990).
5 At one of our first meetings in 1986, we invited Douglas Lasdon from the
Legal Action Center for the Homeless in New York City. Lasdon told us that he
took pride in starting every talk he gave by stating that the Legal Action Center was
the only law practice in the United States providing legal services outreach to the
homeless. From then on, he told us, he would change "only" to "first." We interpreted that as giving us a claim to "second."
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individuals receiving general assistance,6 litigation challenging
Connecticut's emergency housing regulation (on two separate
occasions), 7 a personal injury action based on lead paint poisoning,8 litigation on behalf of public housing tenants,' litigation
challenging admission policies at a subsidized housing project' °
and a variety of legislative initiatives."
Judged by the successful resolution of court cases, the
Homelessness Clinic has a remarkable record. In its first four
years of existence, the clinic instituted or intervened in six cases2
seeking to affect the homelessness problem in Connecticut.'
The clinic prevailed at the trial level in each case, either through
judicial decision or consent decree. The cumulative dollar value
achieved in these cases on clients' behalf exceeded
$100,000,000.1

3

At least three of these cases resulted in deci-

4
sions that have been widely cited nationally.'
One of these cases, Savage v. Aronson, was reversed on appeal.' 5 Well before the appeal was argued, the case became controversial both within and outside of Yale Law School. The case
was so widely publicized that during meetings involving housing
advocates and government officials discussing homelessness policy, reference to the "emergency housing case," "motel case" or
even "the lawsuit" was sufficient to put everyone on notice that
6 See Wright v. Lee, No. CVNH 8604-1754 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1986)
(consent decree).
7 See Savage v. Aronson, 571 A.2d 696 (Conn. 1990); White v. Heintz, No. N86-502-AHN (D. Conn. 1987) (consent decree).
8 See Hardy v. Griffin, 569 A.2d 49 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989).
9 See Concerned Tenants of Father Panik Village v. Pierce, 685 F. Supp. 316 (D.
Conn. 1988).
10 See Hoyeson v. Prete, No. N88-128 (TFGD) (D. Conn. 1990) (settlement
agreement).
II The clinic drafted a "rent bank" statute, which was enacted and codified at
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-619 (West Supp. 1991). The clinic, for the past three
years, has also analyzed proposed housing and homelessness bills for the
legislature.
12 See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text (discussing cases instituted by the
clinic).
13 The benefits in Concerned Tenants included rebuilding or purchasing a minimum of 600 housing units, in addition to other benefits, valued in excess of
$60,000,000. See Concerned Tenants, 685 F. Supp. 316; Savage v. Aronson, 571 A.2d
696 (Conn. 1990); White v. Heintz, No. N-86-502-AHN (D. Conn. 1987) (consent
decree). Each case resulted in large classes receiving extended housing benefits.
14 See Savage, 571 A.2d at 711-12 (right to shelter); Hardy v. Griffin, 569 A.2d 49
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1989) (Connecticut's first reported decision on lead paint
poisoning in a landlord-tenant relationship); Concerned Tenants, 685 F. Supp. at 321
("constructive demolition" states a cause of action).
15 571 A.2d 696 (Conn. 1990).
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such reference was to Savage. Inside the law school, the case was
criticized as constituting poor social and public policy.
Students spent an extraordinary amount of time on the case
preparing witnesses, researching and writing. In an ironic twist,
the Connecticut Assistant Attorney General representing the defendant complained to the trial court that the Attorney General's
office, the largest law office in the state, could not keep up with
the "superior resources" of the students, most of whom were
drafting their first legal papers. Yet, for all the controversy (and
partially because of it), Savage was an ideal clinical experience in
that it presented virtually every element of what we try to teach.
Moreover, the real-life experience the case presented, particularly the human dynamic of working for real clients, could not be
6
replicated by role-playing or hypotheticals.1
THE PROBLEM

Around Christmas, 1986, the clinic represented several clients living in "welfare motels" pursuant to Connecticut's Emergency Housing Program, a "special needs" program under Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Under this program, AFDC families who lost their housing through eviction,
lockout or catastrophe were eligible for relocation to "emergency
housing" for, at that time, up to eighteen months. In 1986, in
New Haven, emergency housing meant "welfare motels." The
conditions in the motels were generally awful, but the alternatives were the street or emergency shelters for adults, with no
provisions for children. As a consequence of their failure to comply with the program's many onerous procedural requirements,
well over ninety percent of the participants were notified of prospective termination from emergency housing, which would have
resulted in eviction from their motel rooms, their only housing.
Students in the clinic interviewed clients, prepared a complaint
and instituted the case of White v. Heintz, 7 challenging procedural aspects of the Emergency Housing Program. After substantial discovery and negotiation, the parties agreed to a
consent decree favoring the plaintiffs.
16 This is not to denigrate the use of role-playing and hypotheticals. In fact, we
use both in a variety of ways to teach interviewing, negotiation, trial skills and ethical decisionmaking. See Jean Koh Peters, Jose and Sarah's Story: The Usefulness of
Roleplay in an Ethically-Based Evaluation of the Present and Future Family Court, 21 PAC.
L.J. 897 (1990).
17 No. N-86-502-AHN (D. Conn. 1987) (consent decree).
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Subsequent to White, in an effort to alleviate the problem of a
growing motel population (costing approximately $3,000 per
month per family), Connecticut instituted a Rental Assistance
Program (RAP), providing a rental subsidy modelled on the federal Section 8 program. Through RAP and Section 8 certificates,
the clients living in motels were able to move to permanent housing. New families moved into the motels pursuant to an interim
emergency housing regulation (the old regulation having been
effectively abrogated by the consent decree), but these clients
were eventually able to move to permanent housing as well.
In 1988, the Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance (DIM) instituted a new emergency housing regulation that
provided for a maximum payment of 100 days per calendar year
for any family. Because the regulation did not go into effect until
the fall of 1988, any recipient participating in the program on
December 31, 1988, could restart the clock on January 1, 1989, a
new calendar year.' 8 Because of the limited availability of RAP
and Section 8 certificates, along with broadened eligibility standards,' 9 the number of families in motels increased dramatically
through the second half of 1988. A large group of clients faced
possible termination on April 10, 1989, the one hundredth day of
that calendar year.
Throughout March, 1989, clients from the motels provided
students with DIM notices advising the clients of the impending
termination of their emergency housing benefit, with instructions
to meet with a Connecticut Department of Human Resources
(DHR) social worker. Students met with clients and negotiated
with case workers, social workers and DIM and DHR officials, including the Commissioner of each department. The students
were assured that client needs would be met and that alternative
housing would be provided. Other legal services providers
across the state were involved in the same negotiations and re18 The regulation has since been amended twice. The first amendment eliminated the "each calendar year" language and limited emergency housing benefits
to 100 days per 365-day period. The second amendment reduced the 100-day limit
to 80 days.
19 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Homelessness Muddle, 99 PUB. INTEREST 45, 46-52
(1990) (arguing that liberal eligibility standards for shelter beds draw families and
individuals primarily from other housing and not from the street). As Ellickson
noted, there is little evidence of homeless families on the streets in New Haven. In
addition, Ellickson argued that the State created financial incentives for AFDC families to become homeless by providing rent-free housing without reducing the
AFDC grant, additional food vouchers for families in emergency housing and priority access to permanent housing subsidies. See id.
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ceived the same assurances. Yet, clinic students, with greater access to the client community than any other legal services
provider in the state, became increasingly concerned that a
number of clients were being offered shelter that the clients considered unacceptable. Much of the housing was in congregate
shelters far from the New Haven community; some was in
boarded-up or otherwise deteriorated buildings, or in areas characterized by clients as containing unacceptably high drug involvement. Each family was, however, offered some form of
housing. The students, and many recipients, came to believe that
the client's minor children would suffer irreparable harm if
forced to vacate the motels.
Legal services attorneys agreed with state officials to refrain
from litigating. Whether this decision was because they accepted
the State's good faith assurances,20 because of the lack of resources or because they felt the case had no merit, an already
complex case took on new dimensions. Aside from the difficult
legal questions, should this case be brought at all? What was the
role of our office in relation to our individual clients, potential
members of a New Haven class of clients, potential members of a
statewide class, and other attorneys who had been working with
us on the same issue? How meritorious was our clients' claim?
At what level does a case have so little merit that it should not be
brought even if the client's own interests would be served by litigating? Did the fact that so many experienced attorneys decided
not to bring the case go to the question of merit? What action
was in the best interest of our clients? Could we hurt our clients'
interests by bringing this case, by making bad law or social policy
or by antagonizing government officials doing their best to help
our clients?
By this time, students working on the case were divided into
two subgroups. One subgroup developed the facts of individual
clients' situations and the second subgroup researched the myriad legal questions that arose, including the existence of a cause
of action, state and federal constitutional remedies, the scope of
the possible remedy and even the power of Connecticut's executive to refuse to spend the full RAP funds appropriated by the
legislature. The students as a group, however, had to consider
the broader ethical and policy questions of whether the case
should be brought at all. To resolve these questions, the class
20 The Commissioner of Human Resources, a former legal services attorney,
made personal assurances that no one would be homeless.
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discussion focused on the ethical question of the lawyer's obligation to individual clients, ultimately breaking the question down
to the basic elements of lawyering, i.e., what it means to zealously
represent a client's interest in a complex situation including competing interests.
While some of these decisions as to how to proceed with a
case may be obvious to the experienced practitioner, this planning process is critical to law students grappling with ethical considerations and client needs. While it would be easy and efficient
to tell a class that a desired public policy cannot necessarily override a client's individual goals, that third parties cannot control
the lawyer's relationship with the client, that not all harm can be
remedied and that judicial relief may be extremely limited, it is
crucial that students be allowed and even required to fully discuss these issues to resolution.
While we spent hours discussing these issues instead of minutes explaining them, the value of experiential learning far outweighed the question of time. With their peers and supervisors,
students learned to advocate for real people with real problems.
The result was an understanding that law is not mechanistic, but
a creative and thoughtful process in which the advocate carefully
determines the client's needs and explores possible solutions, advises the client and acts on the client's wishes to achieve the best
possible result. After days of analysis, the students and their supervisors consulted and determined that, contrary to the position
taken by state officials and legal services attorneys, clients were
suffering injuries and a cause of action existed to remedy those
injuries. Thereafter, the clients authorized litigation and we began drafting the pleadings to institute Savage v. Aronson as a class
action on behalf of the individuals and all other AFDC recipients
similarly situated. 2 '
THE REMEDY

To induce motels to accept homeless families, the State paid
as much as $80.00 per night per family. With food vouchers at
21 Savage v. Aronson, 571 A.2d 696 (Conn. 1990). The definition of the class
became an issue later in the litigation. All of our evidence concerned New Haven
clients. The State objected to certification of a class that would result in the State
treating New Haven recipients differently from those elsewhere in Connecticut.
Although we did not feel we could prove that statewide recipients were similarly
situated (in fact, other communities had family congregate shelters and New Haven
did not), we decided strategically to push open the door leading to a statewide
class. To the State, this was the lesser evil.
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local restaurants factored in, the State estimated the average expenditure per family at $10,000 for every 100 days. 22 Students
had argued against the wasteful and ineffective use of motels
since the inception of this practice by meeting with state officials,
writing op-ed pieces and drafting proposed legislation.23 Thus,
seeking injunctive relief to keep clients in motels seemed paradoxical and, to some students, unacceptable. We discussed seeking alternative remedies, such as injunctive relief requiring the
State to provide rental subsidies to all AFDC families qualifying
for the Emergency Housing program. Based on reports from the
legal research sub-group, however, we finally concluded that the
court would not be prone to consider relief beyond enjoining the
State from terminating benefits under the program. 24 The client
subgroup reported that a number of clients said they had nowhere to go if forced to leave their motel rooms and wanted representation to extend their stays in the motels until they found
suitable alternative housing. The students and instructors decided on a two-fold approach: (1) seek injunctive relief enjoining
the State from terminating any AFDC recipient from the Emergency Housing Program until such time as the State provided alternative, decent, safe and sanitary housing, thus allowing the
State to reduce the motel population through a variety of means,
including rental subsidies; and (2) work with the state legislature
to develop, on a track parallel to but separate from the litigation,
an economic cost-analysis of a RAP compared to the $10,000
cost of a 100-day motel stay. The analysis started as an informal
working arrangement with several state legislators, but resulted
in a more formalized written analysis prepared for the legislature
and general public during the Spring of 1990.
THE LEGAL THEORY

It is the nature of students to ask: "What is the law?" It is
22 Testimony of Lorraine Aronson, Connecticut Commissioner of Income Maintenance, Savage v. Aronson, 571 A.2d 49 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1990). Transcript on file
with the author.

23 Students met with and provided analysis to an ad hoc group of legislators,
showing that permanent housing could be provided at a lesser cost than the State

was paying for its temporary emergency solution, even when factoring in a 50 percent federal reimbursement.
24 Again, supervisors refrained from simply explaining that mandatory injunctions are difficult to obtain, and almost impossible in the context of a preliminary

injunction. The balancing act facing a supervising attorney is to provide the highest quality legal services while allowing students to develop legal theories. This
balance is sometimes described as a conflict between being directive and being collaborative in interactions with students.
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the nature of law professors to return the question. Each semester, we teach and reteach students to reexamine statutes with an
open mind, never accepting someone else's interpretation of the
law without examination. The most valuable answer a clinician
can give to a student's question of law is: "What does the statute
(or case law) say?" The goal is not simply for the student to learn
the law or even to learn that reading the statute is important, but
to ingrain in the student a process of critical reading, with a sense
that each reading is a fresh one, with a possibility of new interpretation. We examine cases in which lawyers interpreted statutes differently than their predecessors and which resulted in
historic decisions expanding clients' rights. We teach students
that challenging accepted notions is a critical element in
lawyering.
We also teach the precept: "If it offends your sense of justice, there is a cause of action." 5 While somewhat at odds with
the maxim that not every right has a remedy, this precept challenges students to think creatively to develop a legal theory when
faced with perceived injustice. We begin by brainstorming, listing all possible causes of action, then breaking down each cause
of action into its elements and each element into facts we would
have to prove, along with any unresolved legal issues. 26
In Savage, this process led to an exhaustive analysis of constitutional, statutory and common law theories. The discussion
around theories was free-wheeling, with students supporting
their theories before the group. Occasionally, students convinced other students to work with them to develop their theories
further, sometimes they were convinced that their ideas needed
more work before being presented to the group again and at
25 1 first heard this in 1977, from Florence Roisman of the National Housing
Law Project. I have repeated it so many times, students only need to hear "Ifit
.. ." to complete the phrase. As a result, Florence Roisman has been accused of
stealing the line from me. This is my public admission that the reverse is true.
26 We have since institutionalized this process as a separate class within the
course. In the Fall 1990 term, we analyzed the question of whether public housing
tenants or waiting list applicants for public housing could sue the housing authority
for failing to fill vacant apartments. As this article is being written, we are applying
the same process to the question of whether persons suffering from AIDS have a
claim when they are rejected from private nursing homes. This process works best
with a real case that makes use of the tremendous energy students develop around
service, using their skills creatively to improve a client's situation. I would go so far
as to state that this process, with a live client and real problem, convinces some
dubious students that the law is a worthwhile profession. The process also works,
however, with a hypothetical or an actual, concluded case. The analytical process is
the same; what is lost is the real client, which can be a driving force.
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other times they concluded that a theory that looked good at 3:00
a.m. did not necessarily make sense during a daytime analysis. In
these discussions, the clinician's role was to serve as a devil's advocate-to ensure that all ideas were fully developed and had a
firm analytical base, and that each theory received its proper consideration. Yet, much of the clinician's role was to listen, to allow
students to grope through novel ideas, feeling their way to a synthesis of opinion. Ultimately, the students coalesced around a
statutory theory based on Connecticut's AFDC statute, that provided: "[A]ny relative having a dependent child or dependent
children, who was unable to furnish suitable support therefore in
his own home, shall be eligible to apply for and receive the aid
authorized by this part .... "27 Although this language has been
part of the statute and its predecessors since 1941, we could not
find any reported decision that determined whether this phrase
29
was a condition of eligibility 28 or part of a standard of need.
The latter position was augmented by a Connecticut statute providing that the Commissioner "shall grant aid in such amount,
determined in accordance with levels of payments established by
the Commissioner, as is needed in order to enable the applicant
to support himself, or in the case of aid to dependent children, to
enable the relative to support such dependent child or children
'
and himself, in health and decency. "30
Students researching causes of action concluded that the
statute set a standard of need. While this interpretation did not
conflict with any case law we could find, we were concerned that
the statute had stood unchallenged in a jurisdiction where legal
services attorneys actively litigated entitlements issues for over
twenty years. That raised two questions: (1) did it matter that the
administrative agency never referred to the statute in recommending benefit levels to the legislature, a practice in which the
legislature acquiesced by voting on benefit levels without any reference to real-world need; and (2) could we convince the court
that the current circumstances facing AFDC recipients differed
from the historical application of the statute? Supervisors asked
27 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §

17-85 (West 1988).

28 For example, a requirement that recipients of AFDC funds be situated in
homes to care for their minor children.
29 For example, a legislative pronouncement that the Commissioner of Income
Maintenance, who elsewhere in the statute is granted the authority to set AFDC
levels (with legislative approval), must provide a grant sufficient for the recipient to
provide shelter.
30 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-82d (West 1988).
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students what factors caused courts to revisit prior decisions:
How could a case that was lost have been won? How did we get
from Plessey v. Ferguson s" to Brown v. Board of Education ?32
Resolving those questions led to a breakthrough on the part
of students in understanding the importance of developing the
trial record and that case law takes different turns depending on
the factual record cultivated by the litigator. While that may
seem like a basic proposition, the case method trains students to
examine law through appellate decisions. Students generally
think of litigation as a test of brief-writing and oral-persuasive
skills, with facts falling into place, and the chance of developing
new rights depending on writing a better brief and making an
argument superior to that of one's adversary. Here, as in all
cases, the supervisors challenged the students to develop a theory of the case in which-the factual basis they developed could
compel the court to look at the statute differently.
The factual aspect of the case now became a top priority,
with students developing individual stories and expert testimony
to establish the necessary factual conclusions. The students suspected that an historical distinction existed that would enable
them to bring the court beyond past decisions: however low the
AFDC grant may have been, the cost of housing relative to the
total grant was such that a recipient could afford to pay for housing from the grant. In fact, until the early 1970's, when Connecticut adopted a "flat grant" system, the AFDC grants included a
district shelter component, which a recipient could receive only if
she resided in housing that cost at least as much as the shelter
allowance. The students' interviews with their clients, however,
led the students to conclude that the cost of available apartments
in New Haven now exceeded the total AFDC grant.3 3 Ultimately,
the key witness in proving this aspect of the case was a Connecticut "home finder," an independent contractor with real estate
163 U.S. 537 (1896) (establishing the "separate but equal" doctrine).
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring "separate but equal" doctrine unconstitutional with respect to educational facilities).
33 The Homelessness Clinic's continuity as a law practice was helpful in this regard. Although none of the students had participated in White v. Heintz, our previous attack on the Emergency Housing Program, supervisors could direct students
toward our work in that case concerning the affordability of housing. In January,
1987, a clinic student took that day's edition of the New Haven Journal Courier (a
morning newspaper, now defunct) and called every apartment listing, from the perspective of a mother with two children receiving an AFDC grant. She could not
find a single apartment that she could afford on a monthly AFDC grant.
31
32
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experience retained by DHR to find apartments for AFDC recipients living in motels.
The students learned everything they could about
homefinders, not only interviewing them, but examining why
they succeeded and why they failed in finding housing for particular clients.3 4 One fact stood out: the homefinder found apartments only for families with Section 8 or RAP subsidies. Without
the subsidies, the homefinders concluded that rents were too
high to merit what would inevitably be a fruitless search. The
homefinders, the State's own experts in locating affordable housing for AFDC families, would testify that rental rates in the New
Haven area were equal to or greater than the entire AFDC grant.
The realization that one of our crucial elements would be established by a witness retained by the defendant resulted in renewed
and infectious enthusiasm by students and supervisors alike. The
hard work was paying off.
THE PLEADINGS

It would be difficult to conceive of a hypothetical with more
extensive pleadings than those in Savage v. Aronson. A complete
list of the trial court pleadings is attached as an appendix. On
each pleading, the students continued to work collaboratively.
The complaint listed seven students as participating in the drafting; the motion in support of a temporary injunction listed five
students. Other memoranda listed anywhere from two to five
students.
Taking the complaint as an example, this collaborative effort
consisted of students working singly or in pairs to develop the
individualized facts for each of eight named plaintiffs, 3 5 while
other students drafted sections on statutory and constitutional
legal theories. As the parts were put together and the complaint
was assembled and revised, a smaller number of students worked
on drafting a cohesive document. This was not a process anyone
would recommend as an efficient way to produce pleadings. Innumerable drafts circulated through what seemed to be an infinite number of hands, with arguments into the early morning
34 We had prior experience with the homefinder program. Members of the
clinic had worked with Yale University undergraduates to start a similar service.
35 Students met clients at regularly scheduled "outreach" programs at the motels where the students provided legal services to homeless families and individuals.
We decided early in the process that each student would retain personal responsibility for representing his or her client(s) throughout the trial, including developing
facts and presenting testimony.
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hours over particular wording or whether a constitutional claim
made sense. Yet, efficiency aside, each student working on the
project not only had the opportunity to draft a complaint, but to
consider the strategy of raising particular claims, the problem of
overstating facts that would later have to be proved and the strategic value of disclosing or withholding information through a
complaint. In short, students participated in the often tense process by which litigators approach a case as a way of solving a difficult and complex problem.
The number of pleadings produced in a short period of time
was extraordinary. In addition, the diversity of subject matter
was unexpectedly wide. While we could predict a motion to dismiss, it was more difficult to foresee a motion for a protective
order to foreclose depositions (on the grounds that the deponents were available to testify in court). Students were surprised
initially by the frequency of motions and the lack of advance notice, but were energized by the give-and-take of the courtroom.
The State routinely filed motions at the start of a day's testimony.
Because these motions frequently raised jurisdictional issues, we
had to choose between proceeding immediately or delaying the
preliminary injunction hearing. Invariably, we proceeded.
In one instance, the State's memorandum cited two cases
that, if they stood for the propositions cited, were disastrous on
the question of sovereign immunity. The State had barely started
its argument before the relevant law books appeared in the courtroom, although the courthouse itself did not have a law library.
One of the students had literally run the four blocks to the Yale
Law School library. The holdings of the cases had been badly
overstated. The ability to respond immediately to the State's argument, amidst students hurrying in and out of the courtroom
and a flurry of activity at the counsel table, created a high level of
excitement for not only the students, but also for the clients and
other observers in attendance, including the press.
The process of creating the initial papers (complaint, motion
for temporary injunction, memorandum in support of motion for
temporary injunction) was not replicated to the same degree as
the case continued, for responsibilities became more diverse and
students accepted primary responsibility for certain motions. All
work continued to be collaborative, however, and each document
circulated through several students and two or three supervising
attorneys.
On April 10, 1989, we advised the Attorney General's Office

19921

HOMELESS CLINIC EXPERIENCE

1263

of our intent to seek a temporary restraining order and arranged
to meet later that day with the judge presiding over housing matters. Four students and two supervisors presented the motion
for a temporary restraining order to the court in chambers. The
State was represented by two Assistant Attorneys General and
two administrators-one each from DIM and DHR.3 6 The students presented the case for restraining DIM from terminating
the recipients' emergency housing benefits. While we prepared
extensively for the argument, once in chambers, the supervisors
played a supporting role, introducing the students to the judge
and allowing them to make our argument. The State's representatives assured the court that alternative housing would be found
for all recipients and that no one would be harmed. Based on
these assertions, the court denied the temporary restraining order, but scheduled an injunction hearing for April 14, 1989. We
knew that any chance we had to prevail on April 14th depended
on our ability to show harm.
PREPARATION-THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION HEARING

Up to this point, the case involved research, drafting, case
discussions and preparation. Office work is forgiving, with a
large margin for error, as student work is always reviewed by an
attorney before leaving the office. Even the motion for a restraining order, while a good introduction to the judge, was informal, without the rigor and formality of the courtroom. Trial
work, particularly for first-year students with limited, if any, prior
exposure to the rules of evidence, provided new difficulties.3 7
We also had to consider whether to limit the number of students participating in court. We resolved the latter question in
favor of including as many students as were actually working on
the case. While this approach could lead to a disjointed presentation in some cases and might irritate some judges, Savage was
tried in the Housing Session by a judge who had a great deal of
experience with students appearing before him." We were con36 Although the DIM Commissioner was the only defendant as the payor of
emergency housing payments, DHR provided social services and made motel placements for recipients. The State treated the case as though both agencies were
defending.

37 Connecticut's student intern rule permits students to be certified to represent
clients in court after completing two semesters of law school, or one semester if

participating in a faculty supervised law school clinical program. See CONN. PRAC.
BOOK § 67-75.
38 Students from Yale Law School's Landlord-Tenant Clinic appeared in several
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fident that, under the circumstances, the educational value to students of presenting testimony and argument did not conflict with
our duty of zealous representation of our clients and, indeed,
might enhance it in the eyes of this particular judge. This allowed each student to concentrate on preparing and presenting
the testimony of a single client with whom the student had been
working throughout the litigation.
Client preparation presented some unique problems. We
wanted to assemble the clients in a group to talk about the case
before preparing them individually. While we wanted a prompt
hearing, the short time between the April 10 denial of the restraining order and the April 14 injunction hearing limited our
chances of getting the entire client group together. Added to
this were the facts that our clients each had a child or children,
often of pre-school age, depended on public transportation and
had difficulty planning meals because they depended on food
vouchers for specific restaurants near their respective motels.
To meet everyone's needs, the students organized a client
preparation session at Yale Law School. While some students
were responsible for transporting clients to and from the session,
others were in charge of food and still others responsible for
child care while the clients were prepared for their testimony.
While the event was unusual, clients were able to focus their attention on court preparation without distractions. As an unexpected side benefit, the session helped bring about a strong
sense of camaraderie among the entire team of clients, students
and supervisors. 39
Students preparing witnesses wrote drafts of proposed questions, which were reviewed and revised with supervising attorneys. At the preparation event, the students reviewed the
questions with the clients and ran through a trial examination. In
each case, a second student cross-examined the client. By the
end of the session, we were convinced that the clients were well
prepared and that we could present a compelling showing of
harm.
Our discussions about what students could do included tasks
cases each week before the same judge. Those cases were considerably less complex than Savage. A few of the Homelessness students also appeared before the
same court earlier in the semester.
39 This closeness survived the litigation. Several clients who never before
worked together (although they lived in the same building) formed support groups
and provided child care for each other. One of the clients has since participated in

our class, lending the viewpoint of an individual client in class action litigation.
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some students felt uncomfortable performing. As intimidating as
standing up in a courtroom and actually speaking may be, we
have found the experience to be one that students prize highly.
At the same time, students have a good sense of what is reasonable and what is overwhelming for them. Generally, direct examination is easier than cross-examination, fact witnesses are easier
than expert witnesses and the handling of physical evidence can
evoke terror if there is an objection. We agreed that supervising
attorneys would examine the Commissioner of Income Maintenance (whom we called as an adverse witness), present our experts on homelessness and education, and cross-examine certain
of the defense witnesses.
THE HEARING

On April 14, 1989, the hearing began with the State's motion to dismiss, raising defenses of sovereign immunity and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court, having read
the State's motion and memorandum, requested that the plaintiffs argue first, in response to the written arguments. The case
began with a first-year student, in his first appearance on the record, arguing in opposition to the State's motion. After argument, including rebuttal by the State, the court denied the
motion.
That, however, did not resolve preliminary matters. On the
morning of the hearing, the State filed two additional motions:
one to join the Secretary of the United States Department of
Health and Human Services as a necessary party and another to
join the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Children and Youth Services as a necessary party. These motions
were received immediately prior to the hearing, and the students
and supervisors agreed that the response should be made by a
supervising attorney. As it happens, it was during this argument
that students produced the text of the cases cited in the memorandum while the State was making its argument. The court denied both motions, which lead to further discussion on the
record. After oral argument and colloquy, comprising seventyfour pages of transcript and taking up most of the morning, the
plaintiffs were able to call their first witness, an expert on children's welfare and development. He was interrogated by a supervising attorney.
The next four witnesses were fairly brief. Three were involved in managing homeless shelters where the State sought to

1266

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1250

place class members; each was interrogated by a different student, one of whom had argued in opposition to the motion to
dismiss. The testimony showed that the shelters were not
equipped to meet individual transportation or educational needs.
The fourth witness, the Director of Testing for the New Haven
Public Schools, testified that missing as few as ten school days
could have a substantial effect on a young student's future reading ability. This testimony was important, as DIM proposed
moving New Haven clients to family congregate shelters in other
towns, which would likely result in missed school. By coincidence, the New Haven Board of Education had recently completed testing the effect of absenteeism on reading. The Director
was examined by a supervising attorney. At that point, we were
ready for what we all thought was the crucial part of the day and
for which our clients had waited so patiently: the testimony of
the clients themselves.
During the afternoon session, we examined three witnesses,
all of whom were clients. Students questioned each witness. Supervisors intervened rarely and only on issues unrelated to the
testimony, as on a question of class certification that arose during
the questioning of one witness. At the end of the day, we renewed our motion for injunctive relief. A supervisor made the
argument. After argument, the court stated that, in denying the
motion for a temporary restraining order:
I was assured that nobody would be homeless as a result
of the action that I did not take. And I hear testimony today
that that has not really been the case ....
[Blut what I am confronted with is a situation where the
people who have come into this Court looking for help are
being told to wait, we'll get to you. Now many times the court
system does that. But occasionally, a court is in a position to
give them some immediate action, and we have given them immediate action.
I'm not suggesting that it's an emotional issue, but what it
is, I think, is on the plaintiffs side, there are actual hardship
examples, there is actual heartbreak, there's actual anxiety,
and there are people whose lives-at least by their own perception and by what I perceive-their immediate future is a
little gloomy, to say the least ....
I turned them down Monday because I wanted to see what
this was all about. I think today they are entitled to their temporary relief.4"
40

Transcript, Savage v. Aronson, 571 A.2d 696 (Conn. 1991).
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With that, the injunction was granted. It is impossible to express on paper the jubilation the students, clients and supervisors
felt. We set out to prove harm and that was precisely what the court
found after the day's testimony. The case, however, was just beginning, and the next day of testimony was set for April 18, 1989.
On April 18, we began with the testimony of the State's
homefinder, who was a DHR contractor. He was questioned by a
student who had become especially expert concerning the
homefinders' work, through which approximately five hundred families (each of them recipients of Emergency Housing benefits) had
been placed in permanent housing. The homefinder testified that
the families he served had monthly incomes of $434 for a one-child
family, $534 for a family with two children, $627 for a family with
three children, and $717 for a four-child family. 4 After being qualified as an expert as to the market rents for the New Haven community, the homefinder testified that the average rents for an
apartment where the tenants had to pay utilities would be in the
area of $450 to $475 for a one-bedroom apartment, $550 to $575
for a two-bedroom apartment and $650 to $700 for a three-bedroom apartment. The homefinder testified that of the five hundred
families, he was able to place only two families without rental
subsidies.
The latter number visibly surprised the judge. The transcript
reads as follows:
Q. How many of those families were without subsidies
that you described?
A. Two.
Q. Okay.
THE COURT: How many?
THE WITNESS: Two.
THE COURT: Two out of five-hundred did not have subsidies, is that what you said?
THE WITNESS: During the two-and-one-half-years, I
placed two families without subsidies-or assisted two families
42
in finding housing.

The only intervention on the record by a supervisor during direct
examination, which took twenty-seven pages, occurred when a supervisor requested that opposing counsel make objections to the
court and not address the student directly.
41

These figures corresponded to AFDC figures. Interestingly, the State did not

present testimony about the value of food stamps or medical benefits.
42

Transcript, Savage v. Aronson, 571 A.2d 696 (Conn. 1990).
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The homefinder had been taken out of order to meet his schedule, as yet another unexpected legal matter had to be resolved. On
April 14, the court had provisionally certified a class to allow the
plaintiffs to locate class members to determine if any were suffering
harm due to the defendant's actions. The State was concerned
about the release of names because state and federal law protected
the confidentiality of benefits recipients. The court required disclosure to the plaintiffs, but with a protective order limiting disclosure
to the purpose of the litigation. On April 18, however, the State
refused to disclose the names of class members because the protective order had not yet been drafted and entered, a prerequisite the
Assistant Attorneys General had not raised on April 14. That matter was resolved in favor of the plaintiffs and we were ready to
proceed.
The next four witnesses were clients. Our strategy, however,
changed somewhat since the prior day's testimony. Because the injunction had been in place for four days and the court was satisfied
that at least some class members were suffering harm, we wanted to
disprove other elements of the State's case, particularly the State's
assertion that no one in the class had been made homeless. In the
case of the first witness, the student questioning her concentrated
on her efforts to seek permanent housing. In part, the testimony
included a long description of difficulties the client had with an unfair termination from Section 8 housing, showing that not only were
government agencies not helping her find permanent housing, but
that they were making relocation difficult. The second half of the
testimony showed the tremendous amount of stress on her family
and children. Particularly compelling was the plaintiff's testimony
that the State had offered her and her family a one-way ticket to
Puerto Rico if she would agree to leave Connecticut.
With the next three witnesses, the students emphasized the unavailability of alternative housing and the stress this caused the children. One witness testified that the State offered her an apartment
in an area where drugs were sold openly in front of the house and
that she refused to move there with her thirteen-year-old son.
There were additional difficulties with the Section 8 office, even for
clients who were approved for Section 8 certificates. One client testified that she refused to go to a family shelter outside of New Haven
because she would have had to withdraw her son from school. Two
other clients testified that they had been sent by the Section 8 office
to apartments that were already rented; one found an apartment in a
suburban town, but the Section 8 office in the town refused to ad-
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minister a New Haven Section 8 certificate. 4 3 One client testified
that her son attended special education classes in New Haven and
that no arrangements were made for transportation to his school.
The accumulated testimony successfully presented a picture of a
state bureaucracy that made promises with one hand that the other
hand failed to keep. On April 14, we had shown that the State's
assurance to the court was inaccurate because people were, in fact,
injured. On April 18, we showed that the State's assurance that it
was providing alternative housing was just as false. We felt that we
had shown that the State could not successfully implement its supposed plan for relocating class members.
As our last witness, we called the Commissioner of Income
Maintenance as an adverse witness. We wanted to tie DIM into the
false promises of substitute housing made by DHR and the Section
8 offices, thereby establishing an overall plan-instituted by the defendant DIM-to "relocate" people when it terminated emergency
housing benefits. A supervising attorney was interrogating the
Commissioner when the matter was adjourned until April 25, 1989.
While strange things happen in any complex litigation, April
25, 1989, started with a particularly odd event. The plaintiffs had
filed an amended complaint in accordance with Connecticut Rules
of court which permit filing an amendment as of right prior to the
"return day." 4' Although this was the plaintiff's indisputable right,
the defendants objected. When the court ruled that the objection
could not possibly stand, but that the State could have a continuance if it desired, one Assistant Attorney General argued: "[W]e
don't think we should be compelled to go forward. We think we
would be prejudiced by going forward,"' 45 while the second Assistant Attorney General stated: "[A]t this point, though, I think we
"46 The
can go forward with the complaint as it stands, we're ...
first attorney, visibly upset, interrupted with "excuse me, Your
Honor, can I ....

" The judge stated, amidst laughter, "I think

you guys better step in the back room and get your act together. Go
ahead." 4 8 The resolution was that we would conclude the Commis43 Problems of Section 8 "portability," i.e., the ability to use one town's certificate in another town, have been legally resolved by a change in the statute, but not
necessarily in practice. The Homelessness Clinic began addressing this problem
during Spring, 1990.
44 In Connecticut practice, this date is comparable to the filing date in other

jurisdictions.
45 Transcript, April 25, at 7, Savage v. Aronson, 571 A.2d 696 (Conn. 1990).
46

Id. at 8.

47
48

Id.
Id. The transcript does not reflect the laughter.
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sioner's testimony and then adjourn for the day.
Although a supervisor was questioning the Commissioner, we
had spent a great deal of time with the students planning strategy.
While we planned a very limited scope of questioning, we pointed
out the trap that one can fall into by developing a lengthy crossexamination of one's own witness. We all agreed that the best thing
the State could do was to forego cross-examination and proceed
with its own case. The State, however, fell into the trap, questioning
the Commissioner well beyond the scope of the direct. We did not
object because this provided us with our second opportunity to
cross-examine the Commissioner as part of our own case. The transcript shows that the second and third attempts were much more
damaging to the defendant than the first. From an educational
standpoint, the students knew what to look for and could appreciate
the strategy's success as it unfolded. Additionally, once we discussed the possibility of a substantial redirect testimony, students
had a number of questions to put to the Commissioner. This made
the redirect exciting for all of us.
At the conclusion of the Commissioner's redirect, the plaintiffs
presented one final witness, a social worker who operated shelters
for homeless families and provided social services in New York City.
Questioned by a student, the witness testified that transfer from
shelter to shelter had a deleterious effect on families, especially their
children's education. He also described the resulting disruptions in
medical care, separation of families and increased mental health
problems. With the conclusion of this testimony, the plaintiffs
rested.
The defendants called the district manager of DHR to explain
the emergency housing program and the difficulties the State encountered in trying to place families in permanent housing. This
witness was one of the state officials who, in chambers on April 10,
convinced the court that a restraining order was unnecessary because all of the families in question would be promptly relocated to
permanent housing in New Haven. With this witness, the State attempted to separate DIM from the administration of the Section 8
program, but not from DHR. She blamed Section 8 inefficiencies
and errors for failures in a well-planned DIM/DHR operation. The
witness also testified as to particularities of the placements of the
named plaintiffs, shifting blame for unsuccessful relocation efforts
from the State to the plaintiffs. On cross-examination, however, the
witness admitted that the State grossly underestimated how long it
would take to relocate families in the Emergency Housing program,
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and admitted that the State failed to meet its own April 10 projections. She also testified on cross-examination that moving families
temporarily would result in educational displacement, particularly
in a special education situation. A supervisor conducted the crossexamination.
The State presented the testimony of two social workers, in an
attempt to discredit the individual plaintiffs' reasons for not securing permanent housing. The final witness, on April 28, 1989, was
the Commissioner of Income Maintenance, which provided us with
a third chance to cross-examine the Commissioner. The supervisors
cross-examined each of these witnesses. At the conclusion of the
Commissioner's testimony, the hearing adjourned with a briefing
schedule set.
On June 29, 1989, the parties made closing arguments. The
plaintiffs' argument was made by a student who had not yet appeared before the court, but who had participated in preparation
and had a summer job nearby. He did an excellent job.
The proceedings were not lengthy. Our direct case involved
seven students presenting twelve witnesses, with supervising attorneys questioning three more. An eighth student made our closing
argument. The transcript exceeded four hundred pages, the bulk of
which reflected students' active participation. On September 1,
1989, the court and the parties agreed, in open court, that neither
side had any additional testimony on the question of a permanent
injunction and the court consolidated the question of the preliminary and permanent injunctions. On September 20, 1989, the court
announced its decision granting a permanent injunction in favor of
the plaintiffs, finding, among other things, that our statutory theory
was correct and the state statute effectively created a right of shelter
for AFDC families.
THE APPEAL

When we prevailed at the trial level, the State appealed. The
appellate court, acting by a single judge, granted a stay of the
trial court's ruling. Strangely, the State did not act any differently after the stay than before, taking no action to terminate our
clients' emergency housing benefits. Thus, the sole result of having the stay granted was that, under federal law, the State lost the
fifty percent federal reimbursement benefit for the Emergency
Housing Program and had to absorb the program's full cost.
Meanwhile, on its own motion, the Connecticut Supreme Court
assumed jurisdiction from the appellate court. While students
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worked frantically, preparing a motion and argument to lift the
stay, the supreme court accelerated argument and scheduled the
case for January 9, 1990.
Our supreme court brief listed thirteen students as having
worked on it; four were new to the case, recruited by the students
already working on the brief. The collaborative process described earlier continued, with increased angst and too many
2:00 a.m. discussions. The student who had argued against the
State's motion to dismiss and played a major role in the trial was,
by consensus, selected to argue the supreme court appeal.
While at least two, and generally more, practice arguments
(moots) is our norm, by the student's choice, he was mooted
eleven times by eleven separate panels consisting of clinical and
academic faculty, private practitioners, legal services attorneys
and students. While this regimen is not recommended for everyone, we put together as many panels as the student wanted. As
supervisors, we had mixed emotions about the large number of
moots. Virtually everyone reviewing the briefs and sitting on a
panel had a theory of the supreme court argument. We were
concerned that the mixed messages would lead to a confused and
disjointed result. In this student's case, however, the regimen
worked. Before a large crowd of students, faculty, legal services
attorneys and state employees, he made an outstanding argument, showing a deep understanding of the case and a facility in
answering the many questions asked by the justices, who sat en
banc. The supreme court, however, on March 20, 1990, reversed
by a vote of 6-1.'9
WHO WON?

The supreme court ruling came almost one year after DIM's
April 10, 1989, termination of emergency housing benefits. By
the time of the decision, over 1,400 families consisting of over
5,000 people were residing in emergency housing.5 ° While some
may have been able to double-up with families or friends, as far
as we knew, most families had nowhere else to go except the
street or congregate shelters geographically removed from current schooling and support systems. With the supreme court de49 The Connecticut Law Tribune included the Savage v. Aronson decision in its list of
the ten worst Connecticut Supreme Court decisions of 1990.
50 To improve conditions, the State began renting apartments instead of motel
rooms, but at the same exorbitant nightly rates the motels had charged. These
were known as "creative apartments."
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cision, the large majority of these families was subject to
immediate termination of their emergency housing benefits. Because the State refrained from enforcing its litigation victory as to
current recipients, none of them was displaced. Here, just as
when the appellate court stayed the trial court judgment, DIM
kept the families in their motel rooms or "creative apartments."
We can speculate as to reasons for the State's actions. The
large numbers of families in emergency housing overwhelmed
the system. Legal obligations aside, evicting 5,000 persons, most
of whom were children, would have put more strain on the Connecticut Department of Children and Youth Services than its system could bear. Cities and towns could not have coped with the
problem either. New Haven was already engaged in litigation re5
quiring the City to provide emergency shelter for single adults. '
Nobody wanted to evict 5,000 people.
Significantly, 1990 was an election year. By the time of the
decision, William O'Neill, Connecticut's incumbent governor,
faced a battle for delegates at a June convention, with a primary
likely to follow. 52 A large increase in the homeless population,
with accompanying publicity, would have been a political liability.
On the other side of the political scale, legislators, also facing
election, saw a pressing need to address the "motel" problem.
Any permanent remedy for our clients depended on the Connecticut state legislature.
THE LEGISLATIVE EFFORT

Throughout 1989 and the first half of 1990-while the litigation was pending-students met with legislators, drafted legislation and analyzed for legislators a series of initiatives dealing
with housing proposals. While little happened in 1989 legislatively, arguably because of the injunction in Savage,53 our efforts
bore fruit in 1990. In addition to regular meetings with a group
of legislators, students performed two separate functions. First,
students analyzed every proposed housing bill from the perspective of our statewide class of homeless clients, with a recommendation for passage or rejection. Second, students produced a
comprehensive analysis of the RAP subsidy, with suggestions for
51 See Hilton v. City of New Haven, CVNH 8904-3165 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989).
52 Governor O'Neill subsequently withdrew as a candidate, prior to the
convention.
53 The injunction was in place from April 14, 1989, to October, 1989. By the
time the appellate court stayed the injunction, the legislature had adjourned.
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expansion. The results were mixed. The students' greatest efforts went into a modified RAP program; it drew some initial support, but died in committee. The students' analysis of pending
bills was more successful. Ultimately, the legislature appropriated funds to expand the RAP program to relocate the current
motel residents to permanent housing and to better fund a rent
bank5 4 to help prevent homelessness, and thereby lessen the
number of families requiring emergency housing in the future.
Any long-term solution was put off to another day.
CONCLUSION

According to the Yale Law School Bulletin, "[t]he primary
educational purpose of the Yale Law School is to train lawyers. ' 5 5 Judged by the standard of training lawyers, clinical legal
education may well be the core of the law school curriculum,
teaching not only law, but the lawyering process. That view begs
the question, however, because it does not answer the critical
questions: "What do we do?" and "Why do we do it?" Savage v.
Aronson was not simply a successful clinical project, but, within
clinical models, represents the success of real-world experiential
learning as opposed to hypotheticals, role-plays or simulations.
While simulations offer a controlled setting, the passion of real
life is irreplaceable.
In Savage v. Aronson, this increased level of excitement was
exemplified not only by the students working on the case, but by
the law school and New Haven communities. A full year after the
trial, Professor Robert Ellickson, a critic of both our strategy in
Savage and the trial court's decision, discussed homelessness policy with the Homelessness Clinic, using Savage as an example of
bad housing policy. Ellickson pointed out that Savage served to
perpetuate an emergency housing system that created "perverse
incentives" by encouraging families otherwise doubled-up with
family or friends or living in market-rate housing to intentionally
become homeless to enter the motels, which served as a gateway
to subsidized housing.5 6 This presentation led to yet another discussion concerning the attorney's role in problem-solving, the attorney's relationship with a client and an attorney's
responsibilities to the client and society. This exchange was, in
54 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-619 (West Supp. 1991).
55 BULLETIN OF YALE UNIVERSITY, YALE LAW SCHOOL, Series 87, No. 8, at 13
(1991).
56 See Ellickson, supra note 19 for a full discussion.
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many ways, as passionate as our first discussions. This dialogue
was a direct offshoot of the case. Without real advocacy on behalf of real clients, no one would have cared a year later.
Experiential learning in a collaborative setting is difficult.
The experiential part is unpredictable and does not conform to
pre-packaging. The collaborative part is time consuming and
inefficient. The product, however, is well worth the effort.
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No.

Date

Pleading

1

4/11/89

2
3

4/11/89
4/11/89

4
5
6
7

4/12/89
4/12/89
4/12/89
4/13/89

8

4/14/89

9

4/14/89

10

4/18/89

11
12
13
14

4/25/89
4/28/89
4/28/89
4/28/89

15

5/23/89

16

5/23/89

17
18

5/23/89
5/30/89

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

6/29/89
8/11/89
8/19/89
8/31/89
9/20/89
9/20/89
9/29/89
10/3/89

Application for Waiver of Fees and Payment of
Costs
Complaint
Motion for Temporary Injunction, Order to Show
Cause, and Memorandum
Motion for Class Certification and Memorandum
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum
Plaintiff's Motion to Take Depositions
Defendant's Objection to Further Proceedings and
Memorandum
Defendant's Motion to Join U.S. Secretary of
Health and Human Services as a Necessary Party
and Memorandum
Defendant's Motion to Join Commissioner of
Children and Youth Services, State of Connecticut,
as a Necessary Party and Memorandum
Defendant's Motion to Reargue Granting of
Temporary Injunction
Protective Order
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss
Memorandum in Opposition to Temporary
Injunction
Motion and Memorandum in Opposition to Class
Certification
Motion for Articulation
Reply Memorandum in Support of Application for
Temporary Injunction
Memoranda to Questions Propounded by Judge
Motion to Dissolve Interim Order of Court
Objection to Motion to Dissolve
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dissolve
Defendant's Application for Stay of Injunction
Answer
Appeal filed
Motion for Review

